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A B S T R A C T
Living Homo sapiens can define itself using both behavioral and anatomical uni-
quenesses. But is this possible when looking backward? Using a strict morphological
definition, Homo sapiens can probably be traced back in the fossil record to about 150
kyr ago, which fits well with molecular estimates for the ancestor of all living human
populations. However, activities reliably indicating established symbolic cognition can
be recognized in the archaeological record only back to under 100 kyr ago. Since it is
probable that the potential for symbolic cognition was born in the genetic/structural al-
terations that also gave rise to the distinctive morphological entity Homo sapiens, it ap-
pears that the expression of the human symbolic cognitive potential had to await, for
many millennia, the »discovery« of that potential through a cultural rather than a bio-
logical stimulus. Most plausibly, this stimulus was the invention of language. Modern
human symbolic cognition is not an extrapolation of pre-existing evolutionary trends,
suggesting that Homo sapiens is not biologically »fine-tuned« for any specific behavior
patterns.
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Introduction
Homo sapiens has always found itself
oddly difficult to define. Indeed, when he
first classified our species among the
other primates in the tenth edition of
Systema Naturae, the great Linnaeus
himself1 made do with the noncommittal
statement nosce te ipsum (know thyself),
in place of the anatomical features that
he cited as diagnostic of every other ani-
mal species he classified. Almost cer-
tainly, the origin of this long-running dif-
ficulty, going back to Aristotle at least,
and presumably beyond, lies in the fact
that while we Homo sapiens have tradi-
tionally classified other organisms on the
basis of their morphologies, it is by our
own behavioral oddities that we are most
deeply impressed. We are, it appears, so
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entranced by our cognitive uniqueness
that we seem to take almost for granted
the extensive anatomical peculiarities that
stem from our unprecedented combina-
tion of encephalization with upright bi-
pedalism. Yet the human fossil record is,
of course, virtually entirely an osteoden-
tal one, and thus one whose systematic
pattern we would normally analyze in
morphological terms. And this in turn
suggests that the intellectual template
we have traditionally used for understan-
ding the emergence of Homo sapiens may
in some sense be inadequate, at least in-
sofar as we implicitly treat our unusual
morphology as a passive accompaniment
to the principal theme of cognitive change.
Similarly, there is a widespread ten-
dency among paleoanthropologists to look
upon Homo sapiens above all else as the
culmination of a single long-term trend
towards increasing brain size, and hence
implicitly as the highest expression of a
pattern of gradually increasing behav-
ioral complexity. In this formulation, en-
larging brain size and cognitive elabora-
tion have proceeded hand in hand, as
natural selection has, generation by gen-
eration, reproductively favored the big-
ger-brained and hence presumably better
intellectually-endowed. There are two
problems here, though2. The first of them
lies in the assumption that natural selec-
tion is somehow able in every generation
to single out the intellectually more gifted
for preferential survival and reproduc-
tion. This notion belies many awkward
realities, most notably that it is the entire
individual – a complexly integrated ge-
netic whole – and not its various compo-
nents, upon which natural selection acts.
Natural selection can only vote up or down
on the sum of the parts, not upon single
traits; and, at another level, species also
succeed or fail as wholes, dependent on
prevailing environmental circumstances
and on what competition happens to be
around. As a result, it is unwise for pale-
ontologists to try to trace the evolution of
characters independently of that of the
taxa in which they are embedded.
Which brings us to the second prob-
lem. In one strictly limited sense there
has indeed been a progression toward in-
creasing brain size as reflected in the
hominid fossil record. Two million years
ago hominid brains were not on average
significantly larger than ape brains, espe-
cially relative to body weight. By a mil-
lion years ago they had approximately
doubled in size, and by a hundred thou-
sand years ago they had doubled again
(see summary in ref.3). These are, how-
ever, averages for our family Hominidae
as a whole. If hominid evolution had truly
taken the form of one single-minded with-
in-lineage slog toward increasing ence-
phalization, then despite the fact that the
precise link between brain size and intel-
ligence is unknown, such size increase
would carry a strong implication that lar-
ger brain sizes had over the generations
been favored by reproductive success.
But, as the hominid fossil record contin-
ues to expand, it becomes ever clearer
that human evolution has not been a
story of fine-tuning within a single lin-
eage. Instead, the pattern seems to have
been one of the preferential survival of
larger-brained species in a diverse group
within which evolutionary experimenta-
tion appears to have been the rule, with
multiple species originations and extinc-
tions4. If this is indeed the case, we need
of course to know a great deal about the
systematics of that group, and about the
attributes of its component species, if we
are to make any useful statements about
any precise patterns of brain size in-
crease over time. And even with a rapidly
improving fossil record, at this point in
the history of paleoanthropology we have
no idea at all of the precise number of
species involved, or about the longevities
or the brain size ranges of any of them5.
Clearly, Homo sapiens is descended from
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ancestors that were physically and co-
gnitively unlike itself; but given the cur-
rent woeful state of hominid systematics
there is little that can be said at present
about the pattern of this implied transfor-
mation from contemplation of the fossil
evidence – or, indeed, from that of the ob-
servable behavioral accomplishments of
our closest (but nonetheless quite dis-
tant) living relatives, the great apes. In-
deed, on the cognitive level a much better
indication of hominid behavioral trans-
formation over the past couple of million
years than that supplied by the fossil re-
cord is to be gained from the examination
of the archaeological record which, indi-
rect and incomplete though it may be,
supplies a more reliable approximation of
ancient hominid intellectual attainments.
Although archaeological traces are
clearly the product of the extinct homi-
nids whose remains compose the human
fossil record, the comparison of the two
sources of evidence against the estab-
lished time scale makes one thing clear:
innovation as expressed in the two re-
cords did not proceed in synchrony. Stone
tool making, for example, was almost cer-
tainly invented by an archaically-propor-
tioned hominid that we would classify as
an australopith. Subsequently, the first
deliberately-shaped stone tools (Acheu-
lean handaxes) were made by hominids
that had achieved modern body propor-
tions, but that had for the first several
hundred thousand years of their exis-
tence made simpler tools (based simply
upon the existence of a cutting edge) that
were effectively the same as those their
australopith predecessors had made for a
million years. These developments inau-
gurated a pattern of highly sporadic inno-
vation in hominid technological history,
one lesson of which is that we cannot use
the appearance of new kinds of hominid
to »explain« the arrival on the scene of
new kinds of artifacts or inferred behav-
iors. Almost exactly the same kind of pat-
tern seems to have applied in the arrival
of Homo sapiens, the principal difference
being that once our species began dis-
playing new behaviors, those behaviors
were of a completely unprecedented and
unanticipated kind which, in their turn,
led to an accelerated pattern of technolog-
ical change.
Origin of Homo sapiens:
The Physical Evidence
The lack of any workable and gener-
ally agreed morphological definition of
Homo sapiens has historically been the
greatest impediment of all to unraveling
the details of our species’ emergence. And
over the past half-century or so any po-
tential progress in this domain has been
impeded by the pervasive influence in
paleoanthropology of the linear model of
human evolution by which species are
viewed simply as arbitrarily-recognized
segments of continuous lineages. This
theoretical construct has fostered the pri-
macy of a warm-hearted but ill-advised
scientific ecumenicism that has enlarged
the bounds of Homo sapiens beyond all bi-
ological reason. As a result, a diverse
spectrum of morphologies has been gath-
ered together under the banner of »ar-
chaic Homo sapiens,« with no attention
paid whatever to where this motley con-
struct might end and »modern Homo sa-
piens« might begin. In a final reductio ad
absurdum it has even been proposed to
extend our species to include virtually ev-
ery Homo fossil since Homo habilis6. But
if we are ever to understand how Homo
sapiens emerged as the biologically indi-
viduated and osteologically highly dis-
tinctive entity it is today, we are going to
have to bite the bullet and decide just
what we mean morphologically (and more
broadly, biologically) when we use the
name Homo sapiens.
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Living humans in fact compose a high-
ly distinctive morphological entity. My
colleague Jeffrey Schwartz and I7–9 have
pointed to nine cranial features that ap-
pear among hominoids to be autapomor-
phic to Homo sapiens, while additional
such features have also been recently sug-
gested by others10. Diagnostic skull char-
acters of Homo sapiens include various
features of the temporal bone, a bipartite
supraorbital conformation, and the pres-
ence on the mandible of a true chin
(which is a morphologically much more
complex feature than the real or appar-
ent swellings on the external symphyseal
midline that can be discerned on a vari-
ety of fossil hominids8). And if we use pos-
session of these features as our criterion
for admitting fossil forms to Homo sapi-
ens, we immediately find ourselves hav-
ing to exclude the bulk of those fossil
specimens that have been allocated to our
own species in the past.
The oldest fossil form that has any
reasonable claim to membership of Homo
sapiens sensu stricto is that recently re-
ported from the Ethiopian locality of
Herto, and assigned in the idiosyncratic
manner of its describers to the subspecies
H. s. idaltu11. The Herto specimens have
a limiting maximum date of ~160 ka, but
their claimed minimum date of ~154 ka
has been disputed by Faupl, Richter and
Urbanek (2003), who believe that the ho-
minid fossils and the associated Acheu-
lean/Middle Stone Age artifacts may in
fact be considerably younger than this.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to deter-
mine from the published description the
states of all potentially diagnostic cranial
characters in the Herto hominids; but
from what can be gleaned these speci-
mens have a substantially better claim to
membership in Homo sapiens than any
other hominid fossils of comparable an-
tiquity (assuming that the asserted mini-
mum date is accurate). Among other
early contenders, the oldest fossils that
can lay claim to unquestioned Homo sapi-
ens status are the Israeli Jebel Qafzeh 9
and 11 specimens, dated to 92 ka13.
There is no doubt that these fossils are
Homo sapiens by the most stringent defi-
nition, but interestingly other fossils of
similar age from Qafzeh (and from the
penecontemporaneous nearby site of Skhul)
do not display the diagnostic Homo sapi-
ens morphologies (see refs.14,15). Dated
(with wildly varying precision) to the
time period between Herto and Qafzeh is
a motley assortment of African hominid
fossils that have at one time or another
been assigned to Homo sapiens or to
something very close to it. These include
the specimens from Singa, Omo Kibish,
Klasies River Mouth, Border Cave, and
Ngaloba, none of which – tradition not-
withstanding – can be considered to fit
within the strictest morphological defini-
tion of Homo sapiens14,15. Still less can
various other African fossils of this time
interval, such as those from Jebel Irhoud
and Florisbad, that have also been touted
at one time or another as close modern
human relatives.
Comparative molecular analyses of
both mitochondrial and nuclear DNA
have produced varying convergence dates
for the common ancestor of all modern
human populations (see reviews in refs.
16–18). However, most of these analyses
permit the conclusion that this date lay
somewhere in the range of 150 kyr ago, or
maybe a little more. Of course, this figure
may represent only a minimum age for
Homo sapiens, if all living human beings
are descended from a single ancestral
population that substantially postdated
the actual origin of its species. But it is
very probably significant that, particu-
larly with the discovery of the Herto fos-
sils, the comparative molecular and fossil
records at least provisionally agree that
in structural terms Homo sapiens as we
know it today was already in existence by
about 150 kyr ago. At that time, there ap-
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pears to have been nothing behaviorally
out of the ordinary about this new entity,
which shared the African continent, and
the Old World in general, with an as yet
imperfectly characterized variety of other
hominid forms.
Origin of Homo sapiens:
The Behavioral Evidence
Modern human behaviors are so wild-
ly varied that it is hard to distill their es-
sence. But if there is one thing that virtu-
ally all concerned can agree upon, it is
that the cognitive processes of living peo-
ple are most strongly unique in being
symbolic (see contributions in the volume
edited by Lock and Peters19). We Homo
sapiens do not, like other organisms (as
far as we know), respond to the world
simply as it presents itself to us. Instead,
our minds break that world down into
mental symbols, which we can recombine
to explain and reconfigure what we sense
around us. And it is the ability to make
such mental manipulations that, above
all, allows us to understand and exploit
the world in the unprecedented (not to
mention potentially dangerous) ways
that we do. Mental symbols – like the
mind itself – are, of course, nonmaterial.
But there are many forms in which they
can be expressed in our external behav-
iors – as words, gestural signs, markings
and modelings of various kinds, and so
forth. And in the context of the attempt to
understand through the archaeological
record when and how our unique capacity
emerged, a major problem lies in the rec-
ognition of reliable proxies for mental
symboling.
The most dramatic and convincing ev-
idence for the early expression of sym-
bolic behaviors comes from Aurignacian
Europe where, in the period beginning
about 35 kyr ago, we find abundant and
impressive evidence for the quintessen-
tially symbolic activities of painting, en-
graving, sculpture, notation, music and
so forth (see reviews in refs20,21). There is
no doubt that the Aurignacians, besides
exhibiting modern bony morphology, had
a consciousness that was fully equivalent
to that shared by all Homo sapiens today.
But clearly, this consciousness was brought
into Europe fully developed. Where did it
come from?
Certain obscure, isolated and equivo-
cal expressions aside, the earliest evi-
dence for symbolic activities comes from
various sites in Africa. Some activities
documented from early on in that conti-
nent, including the making of blade tools
(which appear in Europe coincident with
the Aurignacians around 40 kyr ago) as
early as 280 kyr ago or more, do not for
most observers provide substantive evi-
dence of symbolic activity. And reports of
symbolic uses of space upwards of 100
kyr ago at South African sites such as
Klasies River Mouth22, though sugges-
tive, remain inferential. For most stu-
dents of the matter, the earliest unequiv-
ocal symbolic object that is known comes
from Blombos Cave, near the southern
tip of Africa. This is a polished ochre
plaque, engraved with a distinctive geo-
metric design, that is dated to between 80
and 70 kyr ago23. Interestingly, this piece
is approximately coeval with sophistica-
ted bone harpoon points from Katanda, in
the D. R. Congo,24 which generally resem-
ble implements that only began to be pro-
duced in Europe at around 20 kyr ago.
Also from the period between 80 and 70
kyr ago are the small backed microliths
that briefly appear in Howieson’s Poort
levels at sites such as Klasies River
Mouth, and pierced gastropod shells both
from from Porc-Epic Cave in Ethiopia
and Blombos25 that were presumably
strung and used in body ornamentation.
Taken together, these findings suggest
that symbolically-mediated behaviors of
modern human type were at least stirring
among African hominids by around 80
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kyr ago. To infer much more at this point
may be a little premature. In a spectacu-
larly erudite contribution, McBrearty
and Brooks26 argued, on the basis of the
temporal distribution of the first occur-
rences of such behaviors as blade-mak-
ing, grindstone-using, pigment-process-
ing, point-making, long-distance exchan-
ge, marine resource exploitation, bone
tool making, flint-mining, microlith man-
ufacture, pattern incision and bead and
image-making, for a gradual, additive ac-
quisition of modern behaviors by African
hominids in the period between about
280 and 40 kyr ago. And they concluded
that this process was not necessarily
launched by hominids that would fit the
anatomical definition of Homo sapiens.
However, it is far from clear that all of
these behaviors, most especially those
such as blade-making, with its extremely
early origin, are reliable proxies for the
possession of symbolic mental processes
by the hominids concerned (whose identi-
ties are almost entirely unknown). And it
is far from sure that they were all inte-
grated parts of a single historical process.
Further, it is also notable that, archaeo-
logically, the Herto individuals and many
other putative early Homo sapiens pos-
sess unremarkable Middle Stone Age – or
even more archaic – archaeological asso-
ciations.
Conclusion
So how and when did the modern hu-
man symbolic capacity emerge? Do we
see its first glimmerings among hominids
that did not look quite like us? Did it ap-
pear with anatomically-recognizable Ho-
mo sapiens? Or did it it begin to be ex-
pressed only after Homo sapiens had
become established? To gain some kind of
perspective on this we need to turn our
attention beyond Africa, to the Levant,
where good evidence exists that the same
territory was partitioned in some way be-
tween Homo sapiens and Homo neander-
thalensis for a period of 50 kyr or more
(see review in ref.27). For in this region,
between about 100 kyr and 45 kyr ago,
both species appear to have manufactu-
red identical tool kits; and there is little
reason to suspect substantive technologi-
cal or economic differences between them
(though see ref.28). It was only when a
Levantine Upper Paleolithic industry
(similar to the Aurignacian but not iden-
tical to it) appeared that the local Nean-
derthals vanished. The Aurignacian itself
was presumably invented by Homo sapi-
ens émigrés from the Levant en route to
Europe, where in little over 10 kyr they
contrived to displace the Neanderthals
from the entire huge area that they had
formerly inhabited.
These observations suggest very strong-
ly that the earliest Homo sapiens came
into existence as an anatomical entity
significantly before it acquired any be-
havioral modifications that markedly dis-
tinguished it from its immediate prede-
cessors. In evolutionary terms, of course,
this was a rather routine happening,
since the only place where any behavioral
novelty can be acquired is within a spe-
cies. Clearly, there must be a structural
basis to the extraordinary cognitive ca-
pacity of modern Homo sapiens; but evi-
dently the new capacity was not exploited
immediately.
Most plausibly, the appearance of the
underlying capacity for symbolic thought
occurred in concert with the biological re-
organization that marked the emergence
of Homo sapiens as an anatomically as
well as reproductively distinct species. In
conjunction with the apparently much
later advent of symboli- cally-mediated
activities, this of course implies that the
human capacity for symbolic thought had
to be discovered by its possessors, and
that the underlying biological potential
had to be released by some cultural inno-
vation subsequent to its initial appear-
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ance. Measured by its effects, this se-
quence of events was nothing short of
stupendous. But in evolutionary terms it
was actually an entirely ordinary phe-
nomenon, for any novelty has to arise as
an exaptation if only because in evolution
function has to follow form. Any feature
has to exist before it can be used, and ge-
netic novelties necessarily arise random-
ly with respect to any future function for
which they may later be recruited by nat-
ural selection.
What might the cultural stimulus for
symbolic thought have been? The only ob-
vious candidate for such a behavioral
spur is the invention of language, which
is the ultimate symbolic activity and is
something that is so intimately tied up
with human mental manipulations that
it is difficult for us now to imagine sym-
bolic cerebral transactions in its absence.
Even the acquisition of language, of cour-
se, would not immediately have resulted
in the expression of all the symbolic be-
haviors with which we are so familiar to-
day. Quite evidently, the multifarious
possibilities presented to us by the re-
markable human capacity required inde-
pendent discovery too; and indeed, learn-
ing how to exploit our amazing intelle-
ctual abilities is a process that is still un-
der way today, as our accelerating techno-
logical progress eloquently demonstrates.
The extraordinary cultural achievements
of the Upper Paleolithic Europeans show
that by 40 kyr ago the exploitation of the
human symbolic potential was well ad-
vanced; but wherever and whenever this
highly generalized capacity may have
been initially discovered, substantially
after the birth of Homo sapiens as an ana-
tomical entity, the discovery of how to use
it in new ways was a gradual process, and
one that is still proceeding.
The recognition that the qualities we
find most extraordinary in ourselves
emerged late in the human evolutionary
story, and exaptively rather than through
the slow, gradual exertions of natural se-
lection, begs a re-examination of the
myths we hold about ourselves that stem
from the prevailing gradualist notions of
human evolution. Throughout most of ho-
minid evolution, new hominid species
could be looked upon as incremental im-
provements on their predecessors. But
cognitively, Homo sapiens is truly unprec-
edented. The acquisition of our most stri-
king autapomorphy represents an emer-
gent event, in which a random genetic
innovation must have combined with the
existing result of millions of years of evo-
lution to produce something totally new:
a brain with an entirely unanticipated
symbolic potential. Clearly, Homo sapiens
has not been cognitively fine-tuned over
the eons for anything. Our brains are not
finely-burnished culminations of a long
process of perfection. Evolutionary psy-
chology and its alluring reductionisms to
the contrary, our controlling organ has
not been shaped by our »ancestral envi-
ronment« to guide our actions in a spe-
cific set of ways. Even though as individu-
als we are – subject to environmental
influence – the products of our genes, the
human capacity that makes our species
unique is actually a rather generalized
one. Individually and collectively it is we,
not our genes, that are responsible for
what we do. And, so far, the cumulative
effect of our free will has not been a salu-
tary one for the global environment on
whose health, like it or not, our own well-
being will continue to depend.
Acknowledgments
It is a privilege to have been invited to
contribute to this Festschrift in honor of
our valued friend and colleague Horst
Seidler. But this invitation poses its prob-
lems, too, for Horst’s scientific interests
and contributions over a long and distin-
guished career have been so wide-rang-
ing that it is difficult to know how to re-
83
I. Tattersall: Dual Origin of Humanity, Coll. Antropol. 28 Suppl. 2 (2004) 77–85
flect them adequately in a single, neces-
sarily focused, article. Still, the core of
Horst’s interests has always been our
own species, Homo sapiens, and in partic-
ular in its evolution, function, genetics,
behavior and history. And perhaps the in-
tegration of these diverse interests is no-
where better sought than in the mysteri-
ous origin of the admirable and detes-
table, creative and destructive, seductive
and infuriating – and invariably totally
unpredictable – species that Homo sapi-
ens is today.
I would like to thank Gerhard Weber,
Katrin Schaefer, Harald Wilfing, and the
editors of Collegium Antropologicum for
the opportunity to express these thoughts
in honor of our esteemed colleague Horst
Seidler.
R E F E R E N C E S
1. LINNAEUS, C.: Systema naturae. 10th ed., (L.
Salvius, Stockholm, 1758). — 2. TATTERSALL, I.,
SACC Notes, 9 (2000) 9. — 3. HOLLOWAY, R. L., In:
Encyclopedia of human evolution and prehistory.
(Garland Publishing, New York, 2000) 141. — 4. TAT-
TERSALL, I., J. H. SCHWARTZ: Extinct humans.
(Westview Press, Boulder, 2000). — 5. TATTERSALL,
I.: Origin of the human capacity. (American Museum
of Natural History, New York, 1998a). — 6. WOL-
POFF, M., A. G. THORNE, J. JELINEK, Z. YINYUN,
Cour. Forsch-Inst. Senckenberg, 171 (1994) 341. — 7.
SCHWARTZ, J. H., I. TATTERSALL, Anthropologie
(Brno), 34 (1996) 79. — 8. SCHWARTZ, J. H., I. TAT-
TERSALL, J. Hum. Evol., 38 (2000) 367. — 9.
SCHWARTZ, J. H., I. TATTERSALL, Acta Anthropol.
Sinica, 19 Suppl. (2000) 21. — 10. ARSUAGA, J.-L., J.
M. CARRETERO, C. LORENZO, A. GRACIA, I. MAR-
TINEZ, J.-M. BERMUDEZ DE CASTRO, E. CARBO-
NELL, Science, 227 (1997) 1086. — 11. WHITE, T., B.
ASFAW, D. DEGUSTA, H. GILBERT, G. D. RICH-
ARDS, G. SUWA, C. HOWELL, Nature, 423 (2003)
742. — 12. FAUPL, P., RICHTER, W., C. URBANEK,
Nature, 426 (2003) 622. — 13. VALLADAS, H., J. L.
REYSS, J. L., JORON, G. VALLADAS, O. BAR
-YOSEF, B. VANDERMEERSCH, Nature, 331 (1988)
614. — 14. SCHWARTZ, J. H., I. TATTERSALL: The
human fossil record: Vol. 2. (Wiley, New York, 2003).
— 15. SCHWARTZ, J. H., I. TATTERSALL: The hu-
man fossil record: Vol. 4. (Wiley, New York, 2005). —
16. STRINGER, C., R. McKIE: African exodus. (Si-
mon and Schuster, New York, 1997). — 17. MARKS,
J.: What it means to be 98% chimpanzee. (University
of California Press, Berkeley, 2002). — 18. OLSON,
S.: Mapping human history: Genes, race and our com-
mon origin. (Mariner Books, New York, 2003). — 19.
LOCK, A., C. R. PETERS: Handbook of human sym-
bolic evolution. (Oxford University Press, Oxford,
1996). — 20. TATTERSALL, I.: Becoming human:
Evolution and human uniqueness. (Harcourt Brace,
New York, 1998). — 21. WHITE, R.: Prehistoric art:
The symbolic journey of humankind. (Abrams, New
York, 2003). — 22. DEACON, H., J. DEACON: Hu-
man beginnings in South Africa: Uncovering the se-
crets of the Stone Age. (David Philip, Cape Town,
1999). — 23. HENSHILWOOD, C. S., F. D’ERRICO,
R. YATES, Z. JACOBS, C. TRIBOLO, G. A. DULLER,
N. MERCIER, J. C. SEALY, H. VALLADAS, I. WATTS,
A. G. WINTLE, A. G., Science, 295 (2002) 1278. — 24.
BROOKS, A., D. M. HELGREN, J. M. CRAMER, A.
FRANKLIN, W. HORNYAK, J. M. KEATING, R. G.
KLEIN, W. J. RINK, H. P. SCHWARCZ, J. N. L.
SMITH, K. STEWART, N. E. TODD, J. VERNIERS,
J. E. YELLEN, Science, 268 (1995) 548. — 25. HEN-
SHILWOOD, C., F. D’ERRICO, M. VANHAEREN, K.
van NIEKERK, Z. JACOBS, Science, 304 (2004) 404.
— 26. McBREARTY, S., A. BROOKS, J. Hum. Evol.,
39 (2000) 453. — 27. KLEIN, R.: The human career.
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1999). — 28.
LIEBERMAN, D. E., J. J. SHEA, Am. Anthropol., 96
(1994) 300.
I. Tattersall
Division of Anthropology, American Museum of Natural History, Central Park West
at 79th Street, New York, NY 10024, USA
e-mail: iant@amnh.org
84
I. Tattersall: Dual Origin of Humanity, Coll. Antropol. 28 Suppl. 2 (2004) 77–85
DVOSTRUKO PORIJEKLO MODERNOG ^OVJEKA
S A @ E T A K
@ivu}i Homo sapiens mo`e se definirati koriste}i kriterije jedinstvenosti u anatomiji
i pona{anju. No, je li mogu}e iste kriterije primijeniti i retrospektivno? Koriste}i strik-
tno morfolo{ku definiciju, Homo sapiens se vjerojatno prema fosilnim zapisima mo`e
pratiti sve do unatrag 150.000 godina, {to se dobro podudara s molekularnim procje-
nama o pretku svih dana{njih ljudskih populacija. Me|utim, aktivnosti pouzdano indi-
ciraju ustanovljeno simboli~ko razmi{ljanje mogu se prepoznati jedino u arheolo{kim
nalazima mla|ima od 100,000 godina. Kako je vjerojatno da je potencijal za simboliku
stvoren u genetskim/strukturalnim promjenama koje su istovremeno dale distinktivne
morfolo{ke karakteristike Homo sapiens-a, izgleda da je ekspresija ljudskog simboli-
~ko-kognitivnog potencijala morala pri~ekati vi{e tisu}a godina, na »otkri}e« ovog po-
tencijala koje se vjerojatnije odvilo zahvaljuju}i kulturalnim nego biolo{kim stimu-
lacijama. Taj je poticaj najvjerojatnije bio jezik. Simboli~ka kognitivnost modernog
~ovjeka nije ekstrapolacija ranijih evolucijskih trendova, {to sugerira da Homo sapiens
nije biolo{ki »dobro-postavljen« za neki odre|eni uzorak u pona{anju.
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